My Research Projects

Work in progress:

  • The Impact of News Coverage on Women's Labour Market Decisions: Evidence from the MeToo Movement (Job market paper - Click here for latest draft).

This paper studies the impact of news coverage on women's job-to-job transition rates at the county level in the United States, exploiting the exogenous variation provided by the MeToo movement. Using novel data on sexual assault news coverage with natural language processing for categorizing the lexical choice of articles, the average tone of news coverage at the county level is measured. The results show that the average tone of news coverage has a statistically significant impact on women's propensity to switch jobs. On average, women in counties with relatively negative tones post-MeToo movement have a job-to-job transition rate that is approximately 20.16% lower compared to women who live in counties with relatively neutral average tone post-MeToo. Conversely, the average tone of sexual assault news coverage does not have a significant impact on the labour market mobility of men in the sample. Additionally, there is no evidence that other news events, such as news on property crimes, have an impact on the job-to-job transition rates of women. The results suggest that the impact of sexual assault news coverage on women's labour market decisions is amplified by the MeToo movement, especially when information about sexual assaults is conveyed with a negative tone.

  • Honesty and Strategic Behavior in Games, with Tanjim Hossain and Haomiao Yu

​Using laboratory experiments, we investigate how preferences for honesty affect people’s actions in games utilizing two variations of the well-known game Traveler’s Dilemma. In these games, two players simultaneously make a reimbursement claim for a damaged product. A player’s reimbursement amount depends only on the two claims and not the actual price of the product. In the treatment Regular, the unique equilibrium is for both players to make the lowest possible claim, independent of the price. In the treatment Upward, the unique equilibrium, which is dominance solvable, is for both players to make the highest possible claim. We find that subject choice of claims is much higher than the equilibrium in Regular and somewhat lower than the equilibrium in Upward. In both treatments, subjects’ choices are affected by the price, when the price of the product is known to them. Even when it is a dominant strategy to report the maximum possible claim, 60% of the subjects’ claims are affected by the price. Hence, the claims depending on price cannot be completely explained by price affecting the beliefs regarding the other player’s actions, suggesting a sizable preference for honesty. Nonetheless, the impact of the price on claims is greater in the treatment Regular, where the best response claim depends on a player’s beliefs about the other player’s claim---strategic considerations do increase the apparent preference for honesty. Based on subjects’ claims under different prices, we characterize them in categories such as honest, strategic, low claimer, or high claimer. Subjects characterized as honest make a higher payoff when a price is mentioned relative to when no price is mentioned even though they make the same average claim in either case, in the treatment Regular. Preference for honesty leads to better coordination among players in games where optimal strategy depends on players’ beliefs about other players’ actions.

  • Childhood Exposure to Storms and Long-Term Educational Attainments in India, with Boubacar Diop, Martino Pelli and Jeanne Tschopp.

This paper examines how exposure to storms over the course of compulsory schooling in India affects educational attainments and the type of activity performed by individuals as they reach young adulthood. Using the 2018 survey of the labor force together with storms' best tracks over the period 1990-2010, we construct a unique continuous measure of childhood exposure to storms that varies by birth-year cohort and district. We find that exposure to storms leads to substantial and statistically significant disruptive impacts on education. In the districts exposed to the most powerful winds, the estimates imply that children are 9% more likely to repeat a year or drop out. Despite delays, affected children still complete primary schooling, yet they are 7% less likely to obtain higher levels of education. In the long run, these delays are reflected in the type of labor market activity that these individuals perform. Using childhood exposure to storms as an instrument, we find that in India, a one-year delay in education leads to a 44% drop in the probability of accessing the jobs that provide social security and regular salaried work.